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CAPITAL RATIONING AND THE
DETERMINATION OF THE FIRM'S
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR CAPITAL
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent papers on capital budgeting have emphasized the importance of accurate
methods of investment analysis. Discussion has generally concentrated on theoretical
aspects, with limited consideration given to the problems associated with practical
applications.
While methods of economic analysis deserve detailed attention, such related
questions as the determination of performance standards and the implications of
capital rationing are equally important but tend to command meagre coverage in
literature or to be completely ignored. It is the purpose of this paper to draw attention
to these problems by examining their place in the basic theory of capital investment and
by presenting empirical evidence of their importance in the capital budgeting processes
of Australian public companies.
The theoretical examination leans heavily on texts by Dean,! Gordon,2
IJoel Dean, Managerial Economics (9th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959).
"Myron J. Gordon, The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the Corporation (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1962).
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Solomon,3 and Bierman and Smidt,4 plus numerous papers presente~ in current
professional and academic journals. Empirical evidence has been obtamed .from. a
survey in 1964 of 285 Australian public companies using rate of return tec1?mques ~n
capital investment analyses. All these companies had. previously: shown an mterest m
capital investment analyses and had co-ope\ated m an e~rber research survey. 5
Analytical data were supplied by 215 compames-representmg 75 ..4 per cent of ~he
sample-covering rate of return performance. standards and e':Id~nce o~ ~apItal
rationing. The questionnaire used in this survey IS presented OpposIte m ExhIbIt 1.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that:
(a) Traditional capital investmeI?t t~eo~y dealin~ with p~rforItl;ance standards must
be modified when capital ratIOmng IS taken mto consIderatIOn.
(b) A significant percentage of Australian ,Public comp~nies oper~te capital budgets
under conditions of external or self-Imposed capItal ratIOnmg, and therefore
cannot accept as performance standards the theoretical ideal.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Capital investment theory and performance standards
A capital investment may be defined as an outlay at one particular point of time,
made in anticipation of future benefits. The money outlaid may be for shares in a
firm, plant or equipment, advertising, research, etc. The future benefits may be in the
form of cash or cash equivalents; they may be known with certainty or be relatively
uncertain in amount; or they may represent equal annual benefits for a particular
period or irregular fluctuating benefits for an indefinite period.
It is traditional to examine the theory of capital investment on the assumption
that each firm determines its investment policy in such a way as to maximize profits.
In terms of price theory this is usually demonstrated by suggesting that any firm
would choose to balance output of finished units with input of factors of production
or resources in such a way as to equate the marginal costs and marginal revenues
involved. Thus the firm would continue to purchase input and increase output as
long as the additional revenue to be received exceeded the additional costs involved.
This basic theory can be adapted to analyze the behaviour of a firm wishing to
determine its optimum assets structure and method of financing these assets. Thus
it is possible to describe a theory of capital investment for a firm which will determine
the optimum level of investment and the optimum level of finance. In exactly the
same way as for price theory, the emphasis is placed on marginal investment for the
firm under consideration. Our theoretical firm will therefore continue to invest funds
in additional capital projects until the return, or yield, or profit from the last invest-
ment made exactly equals the additional cost of the finance raised to make the
investment.
The cost of finance raised for capital investment is usually measured in terms of
percentage rates. Funds available for capital investment represent retained earnings
(an internal supply offunds), shareholders' or owners' equity, or funds made available
by such lending organizations as banks, insurance companies, etc. Each fund has a
cost. The cost of shareholders' or owners' equity could be regarded as the dividend
percentage, or dividend yield, or the firm's earning rate. The cost of loan funds
represents the interest rate applicable. The cost of internal funds is usually regarded
as an opportunity cost, that is, a percentage rate represented by the best alternative
"Ezra Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management (New York: Columbia University Press,
1964).
4H. Bierman, and S. Smidt, The Capital Budgeting Decision (New York: Macmillan, 1960).
GFor a report of this survey see G. G. Meredith, Administrative Control of Capital Expenditure:
A Survey ofAustralian Public Companies ("University of Queensland Papers, Department of Account-
ancy", Vol. I, No.2 CSt. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1964]).
Classification .
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EXHIBIT I
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND
Department of Accountancy
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE PROCEDURES: A Survey of Australian Public
Companies.
Company No .
Use a tick mark (V) to indicate the appropriate alternative.
Supply details where requested.
1. RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS:
(a) Does your company set a predetermined minimum rate of return percentage
standard for proposal acceptance?
1. Yes. ( )
2. No. ( )
(b) What percentage rate represents the current standard? Give details of any
variation of the standard for different types of proposals (e.g. replacement
proposals: 10 per cent; expansion proposals: 15 per cent).
.. . , per cent
................................................................................. .. per cent
................................................................................. . per cent
................................................................................ . per cent
.............................................................................. . per cent
(c) Briefly, how are the above standards set? (e.g. before or after tax; before or
after interest payments, etc.)
2. CAPITAL RATIONING:
(a) In anyone capital budget period, has the supply of funds for capital pro-
posals been sufficient to finance all the acceptable (profitable) proposals sub-
mitted for consideration?
1. Always sufficient funds available for proposals. ( )
2. Occasionally capital funds NOT sufficient for proposals. ( )
3. Never sufficient funds for all proposals submitted. ()
(b) Has management ever ruled that total funds allocated to capital projects be
limited to a predetermined amount?
1. Regularly. ()
2. Occasionally. ( )
3. Never. ()
Thank you for your co-operation in this research.
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use of the funds available. The marginal cost of funds may therefore be relatively
high-if it represents shareholders or equity funds-or relatively low-if marginal
funds are represented by bank finance.
In order to equate the profitability of marginal investments and marginal cost of
funds for the investments, it is necessary to express profitability in terms of percentage
rate of return. A marginal investment rate of return is that rate of discount which
will equate the outlay on the investment with the flow of benefits that are expected
to result from the investment. Having calculated the discount or "internal" rate of
return for each investment project, it is possible to determine the optimum investment
for the firm by comparing the marginal return on investment with the marginal cost of
funds available for investment.
In theory it is possible for firms to arrange in order of declining rate of return all
investments competing for available funds. If this is prepared in the form of a schedule,
it is usually called a schedule of the marginal efficiency of investment, or more simply,
a demand schedule for capital. If, for example, one project under consideration re-
quired an outlay of £20,000 for a prospective rate of return of 30 per cent, a second
project required £10,000 as an outlay and offered a return of 25 per cent, and a third
project required £30,000 for a return of 20 per cent, etc., a demand schedule for
capital could be prepared in the form presented in Exhibit II.
EXHIBIT II
DEMAND SCHEDULE FOR CAPITAL
Rate of Return Outlay Cumulative Outlay
£ £
30 per cent 20,000 20,000
Over 25 per cent 10,000 30,000
Over 20 per cent 30,000 60,000
Over 15 per cent 40,000 100,000
etc.
__~ .-'-__~ --.J
The data from such a schedule could be graphed by plotting the expected rates of
return against the cumulative investment opportunities to produce the typical de-
clining slope of the marginal efficiency curve. The above figures are represented in this
way in Exhibit III.
A similar curve to that prepared in Exhibit III may be drawn to represent the
marginal cost of raising additional funds for capital projects. While it is logical to
prepare a demand schedule for capital representing capital projects in descending
order of profitability, it is also logical to suggest that the marginal cost of raising
additional funds for these projects shall increase as additional funds are raised. As
each firm tries to raise additional funds either from shareholders or from institutional
lenders, the cost of these would be expected to rise. Thus while the cost of raising
£40,000 may be 10 per cent, the cost of raising each additional £20,000 may be an
additional 5 per cent. The marginal cost of the last £20,000, that is, the last £20,000
to cover the £100,000 required for the total investment projects put forward, would be
25 per cent. If these cost data are plotted on the graph already used in Exhibit III,
the marginal cost curve (which rises) must cut the demand curve (which falls) at a
point which represents the "cut-off" point in the capital investment programme. To
invest funds over and above the level of investment indicated by this "cut-off" point,
would be to accept investments which would produce a return lower than the cost of
the funds necessary to finance these projects. Exhibit IV indicates that proposals up
to between £70,000 and £80,000 could be accepted. Additional investments above this
figure must be rejected as the cost offunds is greater than the return from the additional
investments.
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EXHIBIT III
DEMAND CURVE FOR CAPITAL
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Theory places emphasis on the marginal cost of funds employed. The marginal
cost of funds eventually determines the "cut-off" poi~t for marginal ,investments.
Therefore, in theory, it is assumed that m~nagementwIll attempt ~o ra~se funds for
each marginal investment at the low~s~ poss~ble cost. Event.ually a pomt wIll be reached
where the marginal return on addItional mvestments wIll be so low that even the
lowest-cost funds would cost more than the return from the investment. Theory
therefore assumes that management has at its disposal an unlimited supply of funds
(at an in~reasing cost) and an unlimited demand for funds (in the .form of capital
projects). In practice the latter m~y be t~e .but the former may certamly not be true.
Where there is any form of capItal ratIOnmg, the theory presented above must be
adjusted to take this into consideration and the cut-off point or accepted performance
standard must be similarly adjusted.
(b) Capital rationing and performance standards
Capital rationing may be defined as any situation in which a firm cannot or does
not wish to raise funds for capital investment beyond a certain limit. This limitation
of funds may be enforced by management either by making a fixed total available
for the capital budget, or, while allowing the total amount available to fluctuate to a
certain extent, by applying very high cut-off rates as minimum desirable rates of
return. In both cases the technique results in sponsored proposals competing for
limited funds. In both cases some "profitable" projects will be ignored; that is, some
projects may promise a return greater than the cost of funds involved, and yet be
rejected through a general restriction on investment.
A number of factors may force a firm to accept a policy of capital rationing.
Low profitability may force a firm to curtail future capital investment because past
profitability may have had the effect of increasing out of all proportion the cost of
external funds available. A firm operating at a loss may be forced to rely on equity
(high cost) funds for capital investments, whereas, if the firm had been operating at a
profit, external debt funds might have been available-at a significantly lower cost.
Thus it may pay management to delay desirable capital investment until a present
profitability situation has corrected itself.
Extreme doubts as to the future certainty of operations may result in a capital
rationing situation. All capital budgeting is carried out under conditions of some
degree of uncertainty; however, management at anyone time may consider the future
to be so uncertain that capital projects readily acceptable under normal circumstances
are perhaps better curtailed until future prospects improve. Funds from external
sources may not be readily available if lenders believe the future is too uncertain to
risk supplying unlimited quantities of funds for capital investments.
Government regulations could represent an external influence causing capital
rationing within the firm. Nationalized industries of semi-governmental bodies may
be restricted from time to time by government regulations or government policies,
and the policies of the government-controlled banking system may also cause internal
capital rationing among individual firms.
In spite of the influence of external factors in the capital rationing policies of
individual firms, it is most likely that capital rationing in the majority of cases is
self-imposed. Top management quite often is not prepared to borrow to the limit.
Experienced management would probably consider that a certain reserve of borrowing
power should be retained for emergencies in anyone budget period. Possibly for this
reason, many firms will restrict funds available for capital investment to a total
represented by annual depreciation plus a fixed proportion of expected future profits.
This will leave the company or firm in a position to approach the external market if
any future emergencies arise. Management is generally not prepared to borrow to the
limit of its capacity or the capacity of the firm, because such borrowing may lead to
certain restrictions on operations, imposed by lenders.
Many reasons, some of which have been given above, could be put forward to
30
25
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justify capital rationing with regard to capital investment. The fact that capital ration-
ing may take place means that the previous theoretical considerations must be
adjusted to take into consideration the changed conditions. It is necessary therefore
to examine the theory of determining performance standards under conditions of
capital rationing within a firm.
When capital is rationed, the firm will attempt to select the most profitable
projects available from those competing for the limited funds. The approach to this
problem in theory will depend on the method of analysis applied to analyze each
project's profitability. Generally the approach is to set an unusually high cut-off
rate as a minimum desired rate of return. When projects are analyzed in terms of
rate of return percentage, this raised minimum return becomes the appropriate cut-off
point and the supply curve of the firm's capital changes from that presented in
Exhibit IV to a vertical line atthe relevant cut-off percentage, as illustrated in Exhibit V.
EXHIBIT V
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As can be seen in Exhibit V, the horizontal line drawn at the minimum desired
return of 20 per cent cuts the demand curve for capital at point M, and the vertical
line PM indicates the supply of capital necessary to establish all the projects satisfying
this minimum return. Exhibit V also illustrates the fact that when capital is rationed
many projects, normally profitable in the sense that the return is greater than the
marginal cost of funds necessary to establish the projects, are not accepted, and hence
the long-run profitability of the firm must suffer. When the above (simplified) theory is
applied to practice, management would be expected to follow two basic rules:
1. Arrange competing proposals in descending order of profitability (as indi-
cated by their rate of return percentages).
2. Accept those proposals offering a rate of return higher than the predetermined
minimum.
This can be illustrated simply by referring to the data given in Exhibit VI where,
with a cut-off point of 20 per cent, £60,000 capital is required to finance acceptable
proposals.
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EXHIBIT VI
DEMAND SCHEDULE UNDER CAPITAL RATIONING
Rate of Return Outlay Cumulative Outlay
£ £
30 per cent 20,000 20,0001
25 per cent 10,000 30,000 ACCEPT
20 per cent 30,000 60,000Jf Cut-off
I.. point
15 per cent 40,000 100,000 ~REJECT
While these rules may appear straightforward, their application to practical
situations will inevitably cause difficulties because rate of return analyses may not
indicate the selection of the most profitable projects under specific conditions when
competing projects have differing initial outlays, differing useful lives, varying rein-
vestment rates, or are to any degree mutually exclusive. 6 For these reasons, it has
been suggested by many that the rate of return method of analysis should be modified,
and the so-called present value method' or the present value index method of analysis8
used to select the most profitable projects. When these methods are used, a predeter-
mined rate of discount is applied to the projects' cash flows so that the projects with
the greatest net present values (or present value indexes) may be selected for the current
budget period. The purpose of the analysis is to select those projects which increase
the total present value of future benefits to anyone budget period. The use of these
present value methods assumes that the discount rate is predetermined, and therefore
some consideration must be given to the selection of a discount rate which will result
in the most beneficial projects being accepted.
The selection of an appropriate discount rate is most important, because the
discount rate used in project analysis will determine the projects accepted from among
those competing for funds available. This results from the nature of compound interest
tables, since the present value factors from these tables decrease as interest rates and
future time periods increase. Exhibit VII represents an extract from present
value tables and shows that the present value factor for 5 per cent one year hence is
greater than the present value factor for 25 per cent one year hence; and the factor for
5 per cent one year hence is greater than the factor for 5 per cent five years hence, etc.
EXHIBIT VII
PRESENT VALUE TABLES FOR A SINGLE PAYMENT OF £1
YEARS
HENCE
INTEREST RATE
5 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 15 Per Cent 20 Per Cent I 25 Per Cent I 30 Per Cent
-----1------------------------1-----1---·---
1
2
3
4
5
.9524
.9070
.8638
.8227
.7835
.9091
.8264
.7513
.6830
.6209
.8696
.7561
.6575
.5718
.4972
.8333
.6944
.5787
.4823
.4019
.8000
.6400
.5120
.4096
.3277
.7692
.5917
.4552
.3501
.2693
"For a detailed discussion on these problems see: J. H. Lorie, and L. J. Savage, "Three Problems
in Rationing Capital", Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, October, 1955, included in
Ezra Solomon (ed.), The Management of Corporate Capital (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961),
page 56.
'J. H. McArthur, "Measuring Rate of Return on Capital Investments", Canadian Chartered
Accountant, October, 1960, page 317.
"G. N. Bowles, "Discounted Cash Flow-Interpretation of Results", The Australian Accountant,
XXXII, No. 11 (November, 1962), 614.
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Therefore if the present value method of analysis is applied in the analysis of
proposals, the use of a low rate of discount as opposed to a high rate will produce a
bias in favour of proposal acceptance, because the higher discount factors associated
with this low percentage rate will result in higher present value of future cash flows.
This could quite possibly result in the acceptance of proposals unfavourable for the
firm. Under conditions of capital rationing this situation must be avoided. Consider
the proposal set out in Exhibit VIII, which has been submitted to management for
consideration in the current budget period.
EXHIBIT VIII
Years Hence
o
1
2
3
4
5
Cash Flow
£
(1,000)
100
120
200
500
280
When these future cash flows are discounted at, for example,S per cent, as in
Exhibit IX, the proposal appears to be acceptable, as the present value of future
benefits (£1,007) is greater than the required outlay (£1,000).
EXHIBIT IX
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
-
PRESENT VALUE AT 5 PER CENT
CASH FLow ---~~------~----
Factor Value
£ £
-
100 .9524 95
120 .9070 109
200 .8638 173
500 .8227 411
280 .7835 219
£1,200 £1,007
Ifmanagement discounts the cash flows at 15 per cent, as in Exhibit X, the opposite
result is found. The proposal no longer appears to be acceptable at this high cut-off
rate.
EXHIBIT X
-----------
YEAR CASH FLOW PRESENT VALUE AT 15 PER CENT
~-~--------~-----
Factor
I
Value
£ £
1 100 .8696 87
2 120 .7561 91
3 200 .6575 132
4 500 .5718 286
5 280 .4972 139
£1,200
I
£735
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While the analysis in Exhibits IX and X shows the effect of using varying discount
rates, it might be argued that, as long as the same discount rate is applied in the analysis
of all proposals and as long as proposals are selected in descending order of present
value size, the optimum position of the firm must be reached, as in this way no
proposals would be accepted that offered a rate of return lower than the discount rate
used and only the most acceptable proposals would be approved under these condi-
tions of capital rationing.
However, this argument cannot be accepted, because when an unrealistic rate of
discount is applied to the analysis-unrealistic in the sense of not reflecting the
desired minimum return required by management--then proposals may be accepted
which would have the effect of decreasing the present profitability of the firm rather
than increasing this profitability rate. To present one additional example, if it was
assumed that the cash flows of the above illustrations changed in timing but not in
total, the economic worth of the proposal to the firm might also change.
Assume the cash flow pattern as shown in Exhibit XI:
EXHIBIT XI
Year
1
2
3
4
5
Cash Flow
£
1,800
100
100
(900)
100
£1,200
This cash flow pattern is one which appears to be more acceptable when the
discount rate is 15 per cent than when the discount rate is as low as 5 per cent. 9
Exhibit XII reverses the results of the previous analysis. This is due to the fact that as
the pattern of cash flows has changed, the value of these cash flows to the firm has
therefore changed at differing discount rates.
EXHIBIT XII
YEAR CASH FLOW PRESENT VALUE AT 5 PER CENT PRESENT VALUE AT 15 PER CENT
----~~
Factor Value Factor Value
£ £
1 1,800 .9524 1,714 .8696 1,565
2 100 .9070 91 .7561 76
3 100 .8638 86 .6575 66
4 (900) .8227 (740) .5718 (514)
5 100 .7835 78 .4972 50
-._~---~
£1,200 £1,229 £1,243
-~--------~~----
The purpose of the above discussion has been to show that the discount
rate is most important in capital budgeting, and attention is now directed to the
'Discount factors at 15 per cent give less weight to the negative cash flow of £900 in year, than is
given by factors at 5 per cent.
CAPITAL RATIONING AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 95
problems associated with the selection of an appropriate rate under conditions of
capital rationing.
In establishing an appropriate discount rate or standard of performance it is
quite often suggested that a company should use a basic minimum rate as a cut-off
point, and under conditions of capital rationing this minimum rate should represent
the future average cost of capital to the firm. In theory each firm should ensure that
no investments are made which cannot earn enough to pay the cost of capital in any
one particular period. The emphasis is placed on average future cost of capital rather
than on the marginal cost of capital which, in theory, is appropriate when capital
rationing does not apply. However, under conditions of capital rationing, it is probably
logical for a firm to use fluctuating discount rates from one period to the next, these
fluctuating rates being determined by the intersection of the forecasted demand and
supply curve for capital. This allows management to manipulate or regulate the
minimum rate of return desired depending on the supply of funds available and the
future expectations of returns from investments. It could thus be assumed that a
company would raise its minimum return under prosperous business conditions and
possibly lower the return in the reverse situation. However, in both cases the company's
cost of capital (the marginal cost of capital) would act as a base minimum cut-off rate.
Exhibit XIII represents the situation of a firm committed to a policy of capital
rationing and determined to limit capital investments to internally generated funds
only.
EXHIBIT XIII
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If the minimum cut-off rate is set at 20 per cent, and the demand curve for
capital is Da, the supply curve will be represented by Sa, cutting the demand curve at
point M, i.e. at the 20 per cent mark, indicating that £20,000 will be allocated for
investment. If, due to improved business conditions, the demand curve for capital
moved to the right to a position Db, it would be reasonable to expect the supply
curve in the nature of retained earnings also to move to the right from the position
Sa to the new position Sb, cutting the demand curve at point MI, still at the 20 per cent
line. This representation in Exhibit XIII may give the impression that the cut-off
rate would never vary under any conditions. However, this is not likely to be true,
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but it can be said that changing demand and changing supply as indicated in Exhibit
XIII tends to reduce the fluctuations of this cut-off rate. If the supply of retained
earnings was such as to move the supply curve to Sc, the cut-off point would become
15 per cent.
If it is now assumed that the firm under capital rationing would be prepared to
supplement retained earnings from external capital sources, the theoretical representa-
tion of this situation appears in Exhibit XIV. The supply curves change from vertical
to horizontal lines since external capital sources are accepted.
EXHIBIT XIV
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The original supply curve for the firm is Sa, represented by the cost of capital
which rises with increasing investment. The original demand curve for capital is Da.
In the situation depicted in Exhibit XIV, where retained earnings are represented by
the line OP, apparently the use of the retained earnings can only be justified for projects
offering a marginal return of some 16 per cent. Therefore ideally the firms should pay
out as dividends an amount equal to P-Pl and return the retained earnings to an
amount equal to OPI which satisfies the demand for capital at the cut-off rate of
20 per cent, in this case the cost of capital.
If general business conditions improved so as to increase the demand for capital
and shift the demand curve to the right to the position Db and at the same time lowered
the company's cost of capital from 20 per cent to 10 per cent, then, if OP2 represents
the available funds from retained earnings, the company should be prepared to make
up the additional capital required to satisfy demand at the point Ml by borrowing
from external sources the amount P3-'P 2' In this case the cost of capital has set the
basic minimum rate which will be acceptable for many projects.
While the theory presented in Exhibits XIII and XIV may appear attractive for
establishing rules concerning decision making, the theory does not solve the problem
of determining a minimum discount rate to be used in an analysis in such a way as to
ensure that the most acceptable projects will be carried out by the firm. The above
theory suggests that the cost of capital percentage should be used at the appropriate
discount when the present value method of analysis is applied. If it is accepted that
companies can calculate with some accuracy the cost of capital, it still does not follow
that the cost of capital may be the correct rate to use in such analysis. The cost of
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capital percentage may be the correct rate to be used as a minimum standard of
acceptance but the rate may not be acceptable as the one to be used in the analysis of
all projects. Under any system of capital rationing it is absolutely essential to rank
competing projects in the correct order of acceptance so that the limited funds available
may be allocated over the most acceptable or profitable projects offering. It has
already been shown in this section that varying discount rates may produce varying
ranking orders and it would therefore seem essential to use a discount rate which will
ensure that the analysis will rank competing projects into the most satisfactory order
for each individual firm.
With this thought in mind, consideration should be given to the use of an
appropriate reinvestment rate in any analysis. Under conditions of capital rationing
where the reinvestment rate is substantially higher than the cost of capital, considera-
tion should also be given to using the reinvestment rate as the cut-off point.
Whether the analysis of projects is undertaken in terms of rate of return per-
centage or through the various present value methods, the firm's reinvestment rate
would appear to be the appropriate rate to use in the calculation because the purpose
of any analysis is to evaluate the benefit each individual firm is to receive from each
project's future cash flows. Thus if the rate of return method is used in the analysis,
this rate of return should be calculated taking into consideration the reinvestment
rate expected in the future. If present value methods are used, the appropriate discount
rate should represent the reinvestment rate, so that the overall present value of the
firm will be maximized at the current or future expected reinvestment rate. Having
analyzed competing projects in terms of rate of return, or present values, management
is now in a position to allocate scarce funds to the competing projects either in order
of rates of return or present values.
Under conditions of capital rationing, the following "rules" apply to project
selection:
(a) If investments are analyzed in terms of rates of return, these percentage rates
should be calculated taking into consideration the expected future reinvestment rates
for the firm. Projects should be accepted in descending order of percentage return
until funds are exhausted.
(b) If investments are analyzed in terms of present values (or present value
indexes), future reinvestment rates should be used to discount cash flows, and projects
accepted in descending order of net present values (or present value indexes).
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
(a) Capital rationing in practice
A previous study of the financial management of capital investments by Aus-
tralian companies1o had suggested that capital rationing was not an uncommon
practice among these companies. This was suggested by replies to questions concerning
the supply of funds for capital investments. The management of a medium-sized
manufacturer in the textile industry stated that the funds available for any period's
capital budget represented "a figure struck based on finance available. This figure
usually approximates the depreciation written off in the previous year." In answering
the same questions, the management of a medium-sized company in the printing and
stationery industry claimed that "expenditure is kept within the limits of the de-
preciation claimed in the previous year, plus a proportion of undistributed profits.
Special arrangements are made for extraordinary capital expenditure."
These quotations are isolated examples of self-imposed capital rationing. It
would be impossible to make any general statement concerning the practice of capital
rationing by Australian companies from such isolated statements. The 1964 survey of
companies using the rate of return approach to capital budgeting was carried out to
i·See footnote 5 above.
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establish with some degree of accuracy the extent to which capital rationing was
practised by Australian companies. One question on the survey sheet specifically
referred to rationing (see Exhibit I). Companies were asked:
In anyone capital budget period, has the supply of funds for
capital proposals been sufficient to finance all the acceptable
(profitable) proposals submitted for consideration?
1. Always sufficient funds available for proposals. ( )
2. Occasionally capital funds NOT sufficient for proposals. ( )
3. Never sufficient funds for all proposals submitted. ( )
One hundred and ninety-one companies recorded an answer to this question.
Number of companies answering Part 1 of question: 74 = 38.8 per cent
Number of companies answering Part 2 of question: 91 = 47.6 per cent
Number of companies answering Part 3 of question: 26 =~ 13.6 per cent
191 = 100.0
It is not surprising that the majority of the replies (47.6 per cent) referred to
Part 2 of the question. It would probably be expected that the majority of companies
would occasionally follow a policy of capital rationing depending upon the prevailing
and expected future economic climate within their particular industry. The question
was specifically worded to discourage replies being given to Parts 1 and 3 unless the
companies concerned were sure that these conditions consistently prevailed. In Part I
of the question the words "always sufficient funds", and in Part 3 of the question
"never sufficient funds", were meant to represent two extreme conditions of operations.
Taking into consideration the usual errors of recording which are associated with a
mail survey, it could be concluded that some 38.8 per cent of Australian companies
have not found it necessary in the past to follow a policy of capital rationing, while
61.2 per cent have at some time found it necessary to ration funds for capital invest-
ments. For the majority of this latter group (47.6 per cent), the need to ration capital
varies from period to period. However, the fact that these companies do occasionally
find it necessary to ration capital is significant for purposes of this study.
Comparative data from similar studies into the question of capital rationing are
difficult to find; however a recent United Kingdom surveyll covered a random sample
of 300 public companies from the Stock Exchange Yearbook and analyzed replies
from 120 of these companies. Sixty-nine companies reported that the amount of
capital available for investment in anyone budget period was a limited amount,
predetermined periodically by boards of directors or parent companies. Eight com-
panies in this group qualified their reply to some extent; however some 50 per cent of
the companies indicated that capital rationing was important as far as their budgeting
policies were concerned.
The report of the above United Kingdom survey tends to support the results
obtained in the Australian survey, and it therefore seems reasonable to conclude
that in practice the policy of capital rationing by companies is sufficiently widespread
to warrant an investigation into its effect on the determination of performance
standards.
Before examining the performance standards reported by Australian companies,
it is of interest to analyze the effect of capital rationing on companies within differing
industries and on companies of differing sizes.
"Reported in: G. H. Lawson, "Criteria to be Observed in Judging a Capital Project", The
Accountants' Journal, LVI, No. 672 (May, 1964),222-26, and LVI, No. 673 (June, 1964),267-76.
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Company industry
Those companies supplying data were analyzed into five industry groups:
predominantly manufacturing, wholesale/distribution, retail trading, finance, and one
general group to cover all other industries. The replies of each industry group to the
question concerning capital rationing are presented in Exhibit XV.
EXHIBIT XV
EVIDENCE OF CAPITAL RATIONING·-ANALYZED BY COMPANY INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY
REPLY
Manufact- Wholesale/
uring Distribution
Retail Finance Other I Total
38.8
47.6
74
91
36.0
44.0
18
22
4 100.043.7
50.0
6.3 - - 110 20.0 26 13.6
100.0 4 100.0 50 100.0 191 100.0
7
8
1
16
32.3
51.6
16.1
100.0Total 90 100.0 31
- No~aPita~ NO']_ % - _N_o_. I__%__I_N_O_....._~~-- No-.~~-~~-- -No.--~-~-·· -N-o-:...-I-_-%-
rationing 35 38.9 10
Occasional
rationing 45 50.0 16
Consistent
rationing 10 11.1 5
While it is evident that the sample in some of the industry classifications is small,
it is significant to note from the results in Exhibit XV that finance companies reported
no policies of capital rationing, retail trading companies reported less capital rationing
than the average, wholesale/distribution companies reported more capital rationing
than the average, while manufacturing companies closely followed the average for all
industries.
Company size
Companies were analyzed in terms of company size as indicated by paid-up
capital. Paid-up capital was selected as a representative of relative company size
because this figure was readily available for all the companies included in the survey,
and it was considered that a close correlation existed between paid-up capital of
Australian public companies and the assets employed by those companies. Therefore
if assets could be used as an indicator of company size it was considered that paid-up
capital could also be used as an indicator of size. Companies were classified into six
groups: those with paid-up capital of less than £100,000; companies with paid-up
capital between £100,000 and £200,000; companies with paid-up capital between
£200,000 and £500,000; companies with paid-up capital between £500,000 and £1
million; companies with paid-up capital from £1 million to £5 million; and the final
classification was for companies with paid-up capital of over £5 million. An analysis
of the extent of capital rationing by company size is presented in Exhibit XVI.
Several significant points are evident from the data included in Exhibit XVI.
Firstly, the smallest and the largest companies are apparently only occasionally
concerned with a policy of capital rationing. This is probably due to the fact that the
smallest of companies would be those with the smallest volume of capital expenditure
while the largest companies have greater borrowing power than the smaller companies.
At the other extreme, companies in the size classification £200,000 to £500,000 have
reported a high dependence on capital rationing (69.8 per cent-20.7 per cent con-
sistent rationing).
As a general conclusion, it is evident that capital rationing is an important factor
in the capital budgeting process of Australian public companies. The exact significance
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of capital rationing varies from company to company, depending on company
industry and on company size. It would have been expected that rationing would
occur to a greater extent in manufacturing industries than in other industries; however
this has not been shown to be true, although it should be remembered that quite
possibly the majority of manufacturing companies represent the largest companies in
EXHIBIT XVI
EVIDENCE OF CAPITAL RATIONING-ANALYZED BY COMPANY SIZE
-------------_._-----------
COMPANY SIZE (PAID-UP CAPITAL)
TotalREPLY
No capital
rationing
Occasional
rationing
Consistent
rationing
Total
------1-£1-00,000 £200,000 £500,000D~~~illion -
Under to to to to Over
£100,000 £200,000 £500,000 £1 million £5 million £5 million
No.!% N-;;'--%-- NoT % No. % No. --iZ--- -N~~- -N-;;-~--%--
------~I-I----------
2 33.3 9 40.9 16 30.2 15 36.6 27 47.4 5 41.7 74 38.8
4 66.7 11 50.0 26 49.1 21 51.2 22 38.6 7 58.3 91 47.6
2 9.1 11 20.7 5 12.2 8 14.0 26 13.6
-6110~.022wo.o53 100'OI41·100~57100.0 12r~~o.om_lOo.o
the sample selected. Thus, while the volume of capital investments for a manufacturing
company would expect to be higher than for companies in other industries, the size of
manufacturing companies may make it easier for each company to obtain additional
funds and thus avoid capital rationing. It is also possible that the management of
manufacturing companies will tend to avoid capital rationing if possible, while
management of companies in other industries may be more inclined to ration capital
among competing investments. This may be the result of the fact that capital invest-
ments for a manufacturing company have something of an urgent nature-investments
which management considers could not be delayed, while investments for non-
manufacturing companies may not be of this nature, and there may be a greater
tendency to defer investments until funds are readily available. Thus there could be a
tendency to ration capital to a greater extent in wholesale/distribution companies.
(b) Performance standards in practice
In the survey questionnaire (see Exhibit I), companies were asked to comment on
their use of a rate of return standard in setting a cut-off point for proposal acceptance.
Two hundred and fifteen companies replied to this question, and 136 or 63.3 per cent
of the companies indicated that a predetermined minimum rate of return percentage
was used in deciding proposal acceptance. The remaining companies (36.7 per cent)
indicated that no minimum predetermined standard was used in capital budgeting.
As might be expected, many of the replies were qualified to a degree. For example,
one company replied as follows:
As nearly always the two factors of quality and profitability are
intermixed, management examines a whole proposal and will
accept no return at all in some cases, in order to maintain the
highest quality of the product. If quality is not a factor in a
proposal, there is no fixed standard of profitability governing
acceptance-each case is treated on its merits.
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A second company commented:
A rate of return is calculated but there is no standard applied,
since the percentage return is only one of the factors in each case
for capital expenditure.
A third company has replied:
Each proposal is considered on its merits, which may involve, at
least in the short term, many non-monetary factors.
Another company replied:
Return rates vary from project to project and no fixed percentage
could be read to apply to every project.
A final example of the qualification by companies in the survey is:
In attempting to answer your questionnaire we find it somewhat
difficult to answer 'yes' or 'no' without qualification. As a broad
generalisation, we adopt the view that a proposal does not warrant
detailed study unless a return of at least 10 per cent on the total
first cost is indicated by preliminary examination. However, the
rate of return required varies according to the nature of the
proposal. Factors which enter into this are the degree of risk, the
expected life of the asset, and, in the case of replacements, the
proposal might have to be considered in relation to the overall
situation rather than as an isolated proposal.
That many companies would vary cut-off rates from project to project-to allow
for risk and uncertainty, for example-is not surprising, although this method may
not be (in theory) the best approach to these problems. However, it does seem illogical
to abandon the concept of a minimum cut-off rate because non-monetary factors
are always involved or because each proposal is considered to be best "treated on its
merits".
If the proportion of companies using a predetermined standard of acceptance in
investment analysis is analyzed by industry and by size, some interesting variations of
practice are revealed.
EXHIBIT XVII
USE OF RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS IN INVESTMENT ANALYSIS---ANALYZED BY INDUSTRY
I
UFACT- IVVHOLESALEI RETAIL FINANCE OTHER I TOTAL
RING DISTRIB. TRADING
% INo.1 % No. 1 __2'''- N~- % No·1 %- No.-'-£-
--------- -----
----I
11 I 57.9 37 1 71.263.0 20 58.8 - 136 63.3
37.0 14 41.2 8 42.1 2 100.0 15 28.8 79 36.7
---- '-----
100.01-2-1 100~O-- 100:01215--100.0 34 100.0 19 52 100.0
1---------
MAN
U
L 108
----------
Using
predetermined
standards 68
No predetermined
standards 40
No
It is noticed from Exhibit XVII that manufacturing companies again follow a
pattern typical of the average for all industries. Wholesale/distribution companies
and retail trading companies are less inclined to use predetermined standards, and,
although the sample is very small, finance companies apparently make very little use
102 G. G. MEREDITH
of predetermined standards in investment analysis. This fact probably reflects the
smallness of the capital budget, typical of finance companies.
When the replies are analyzed by company size (see Exhibit XVIII) in terms of
paid-up capital, the smallest and the largest companies are revealed as being those
making greatest use of predetermined standards. Medium-sized companies are
apparently less inclined to use predetermined standards in investment analysis.
EXHIBIT XVIII
USE OF RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS IN INVESTMENT ANALYSIS-
ANALYZED BY COMPANY SIZE
,------------,----------.---
1 16.7 10 41.6 27 I 48.3 17 39.5 19 31.0 5 20.0 79 36.7
___6 100.0_ 24 100.0 I 56-~43 1_00.0 61~ 2SfiOo.oill100.0
63.3
Total
80.0 13669.0 2060.5 4251. 7 2658.4 2983.3 145
£100,000 £200,000 £500,000 £1 million
Under to to to to Over
£100,000 £200,000 £500,000 £1 million £5 million £5 million
Usi~-----N~:---% -N~·I %__ No. _%- N01_% N~__i~ NO'1 ~~=I-N-.~-.~-%-I
predetermined
standards
No predetermined
standards
The survey questionnaire (see Exhibit I) asked companies for details of per-
centage standards used in capital expenditure evaluation. The wording of the question
encouraged companies to give details of varying standards that may apply to differing
types of projects. The question was worded as follows:
What percentage rate represents the current standard? Give
details of any variations of the standard for different types of
proposals (e.g., replacement proposals: 10 per cent; expansion
proposals: 15 per cent).
The majority of companies answering this question gave details of the percentage
standards used for expansion and replacement proposals, or gave a general percentage
which is apparently used to assess all proposals under consideration. A detailed
analysis of the replies by all the companies is presented in Exhibit XIX opposite,
analyzed by company industry.
These replies are further analyzed in greater detail below. However some general
comments appear appropriate at this point. Percentage figures included in Exhibit XIX
have been converted to an after-taxation return standard, and these vary from a low
3 per cent to a high 30 per cent reported for expansion proposals-the 3 per cent
standard by a retail trading company, and the 30 per cent standard by a manufacturing
company. From the total analysis it was quite clear that the percentage standards
which are adopted by the majority of companies are bunched together around the
following percentage rates:
(9 per cent-lO per cent), (12 per cent), (15 per cent), and (18 per cent-20 per cent)
This point is more clearly illustrated in Exhibit XX-a chart plotting the number of
companies reporting varying percentage standards (in intervals of 3 per cent).
Exhibit XX shows that the majority of companies have reported standards
between 7 per cent and 15 per cent on an after-tax basis. It must be remembered that
this chart is a summary of all the replies from all companies, and contains the per-
centages reported for expansion proposals and replacement proposals as well as
general standards adopted by companies.
EXHIBIT XIX
PREDETERMINED RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT ACCEPTANCE AS REpORTED BY AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES
AFTER-TAXATION RATE OF RETURN-NUMBER OF COMPANIES REpORTING EACH PERCENTAGE
31 4.8 1 5 I 617 17.217.5 818.8 9 19.61' 10 10.5 11112112.51131. 13.51.15116 16.5 18 20121 23125.130
% ,% % II % % I % % % % %I % % % %i %, % I %1 % : % %- % % %'% % I %i %
MANUFACTURING I I I 1 I' I I
General percentage 1 I I 1 I 2 1 3 I I 4 1 2 I' 1 I 5 2 3 1 I I
Percentage for expansion 'I I I I 1
proposals 2 1 1 4 2 5! 1 I 1, 1 I 7 I 2 2 I 2
Percentage for I I
replacement proposals 1 2 1 1 2 4 2 1 2
1
1 11 ,
WHOLESALE/DISTRIBUTION I
General percentage 1 1 2 1
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proposals 1 1I 2 1 1 'I i 2 1 1
Percentage for 1 I I
replacement proposals 1 1 1 : I 1 ,
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EXHIBIT XX
AFTER-TAXATION RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS REPORTED
BY AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES
Number of Companies
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
1-3 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-16 19-21 22-24 25-27 28--30
Pef"formance Standard %
In the discussion on the theory of capital investment planning, no mention was
made of the need to differentiate between the replacement and expansion proposals
in setting performance standards. However, it is obvious from replies to this survey
that the majority of companies do set differing standards for differing proposals.
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Probably management is attempting to take into consideration the varying risks
associated with differing proposals in establishing different performance standards
for each type. Whether this is a satisfactory method of taking risk and uncertainty
into consideration is not being considered in this paper. However, when the percentage
standards reported by companies using (a) a general standard, (b) a differing standard
for replacement and expansion proposals are analyzed, it is noticed that the standards
used for replacement proposals are considerably lower than those for expansion
proposals, while general standards fall somewhere between these two extremes.
Exhibit XXI presents an analysis of all the replies received by companies in these three
categories.
EXHIBIT XXI
ANALYSIS OF RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS-AuSTRALIAN COMPANIES
--_. --------------
REPORTED STANDARDS
ANALYSIS One Standard Per-
centage Applied to
All Proposals
A Separate Standard
Percentage Applied
to Replacement
Proposals
A Separate Standard
Percentage Applied
Expansion Proposals
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of
dispersion
16.0 20.0 27.0
10.0 9.5 12.0
12.0 I 9.1 13.5
4.1 6.3 5.5
___3_4_.0_. 1~ 6~0 , 41_.0_
It is noticeable that the median and mean for standards applied for replacement
proposals are lower than those applied for expansion purposes, while the median and
mean for general standards (10 per cent and 12 per cent respectively) are between
these two extremes. Apparently management demands a lower rate of return for
replacement proposals than for any major proposal of an expansion nature. This
characteristic of practice does not follow the theoretical model where risk is ignored.
In theory it would not be necessary to set a different standard for different proposal
types; rather, the standard would depend on the source or the cost of the funds
available for the proposals, irrespective of whether the proposals were for replacement
of facilities or for expansion of business.
The deviation of the percentage standards about the mean is considerably higher
for replies concerning replacement proposals (with a coefficient of dispersion of
69 per cent) than for standards applied to expansion proposals (41 per cent) and for
general standards (34 per cent). This factor is reflected also in the ranges reported by
companies using a general standard, as opposed to those using differing standards,
for replacement and expansion proposals. In the former case, the range is limited to
some 16 per cent (5 per cent to 21 per cent); however, where a separate standard is
used for replacement or expansion proposals, the range is as high as 27 per cent
(3 per cent to 30 per cent).
It is of interest to this study to compare the standards reported by company
industry. This is carried out here in Exhibit XXII, in which the characteristics of the
replies from companies in all industries are compared with those in the manufacturing
industry, wholesale/distribution industry, and the retail trading industry,
(a) where a general performance standard is applied to all proposals; and
(b) where a separate performance standard is applied to replacement and
expansion proposals.
A general point of interest is that the results from the analysis for manufacturing
companies tend to be higher than those for companies in wholesale/distribution or
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EXHIBIT XXII
RATE OF RETURN STANDARDS-ANALYZED BY COMPANY INDUSTRY
1. WHERE A GENERAL PERCENTAGE STANDARD IS ApPLIED TO ALL PROPOSALS
I
All Manufacturing I' Wholesale(
Industries Distribution
-------------
Retail
Trading
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
16.0
10.0
]2.0
4.1
34.0
16.0
10.0
12.3
4.6
37.1
4.0
10.0
]1.6
2.1
18.5
6.0
9.0
10.9
2.9
26.4
------------'-----~-----_.- ----'----_._--------
2. WHERE A SEPARATE PERCENTAGE STANDARD IS ApPLIED TO REPLACEMENT PROPOSALS
All I Manufacturing
Industr~ 1
Wholesale( Retail
Distribution Trading
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
20.0
9.5
9.1
6.3
69.0
20.0
10.0
11.2
4.7
41.8
8.0
9.5
9.4
4.4
46.3
Nil
5.0
5.0
-----_ .._._.__..._---_..
3. Wl-fERE A SEPARATE PERCENTAGE STANDARD IS ApPLIED TO EXPANSION PROPOSALS
retail trading industries. Thus in all cases the mean of standards used by manufactur-
ing companies is higher than that of standards applied by companies in the wholesale!
distribution or retail trading groups, and, in the majority of cases, the coefficient of
dispersion for manufacturing companies exceeds that of the companies from other
industries.
Why should manufacturing companies be forced to set standards higher than
companies from other industries? It is unlikely that the cost of funds used by manu-
facturing companies is any higher than that of funds required by companies in other
industries. It could hardly be suggested that management of manufacturing companies
lacks the ability to determine a correct percentage standard of performance for
capital investments to any greater degree than management of companies in other
industries. Efficiency of management in manufacturing industries surely must be
at least equal to that ofmanagement in other industries. It might therefore appear that
the higher standards typical of manufacturing companies may be associatedwith man-
agement's assessment of the additional risk and uncertainty associated with manu-
facturing concerns. Whether this additional risk and uncertainty is real or imagined is
open to question.
While the standards ordered by manufacturing companies are higher than the
average of all industries, standards reported by retail trading companies (it must be
remembered that the size of the sample here is relatively small) are consistently lower
than the averages reported for all industries, and again this may lead to a conclusion
that the management of retail trading companies possibly does not recognize the risk
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associated with its capital investments which management of manufacturing com-
panies recognizes. Considerable additional research, including many personal inter-
views with management, would be necessary to isolate the factors which influence the
contrasting standards reported by management of varying company industries.
Many replies to this question on actual percentage standards used were qualified
to some degree, and some examples of these qualifications are reported below as an
indication of management's policy in this regard.
Company 1:
Sixteen per cent is currently the standard on total funds invested,
which is a mixture of equity capital and borrowing, and this
percentage will remain as long as our present relationship of
capital to borrowings is not materially changed. This percentage
is a flat average and applied where a project is completely standing
on its own feet-however, where another subsidiary company has
certain benefits from the proposal, then we would be more flexible
in our required percentage profit return. Thus our approach varies
on the nature of the project.
Company 2:
Replacement proposals-25 per cent; Expansion-1st Yr., 16 per
cent, 2nd Yr., 20 per cent, 3rd Yr., 25 per cent.
Company 3:
We do not set predetermined minimum rates of return. We do use
as a factor in our decision-making a comparison with existing net
profit before tax as a percentage of shareholders' funds. We expect
a new project to show a better return than that, but we do not write
down how much better it must be. And of course return on share-
holders' funds varies from year to year. As reserves accumulate,
unless profits expand as fast as shareholders' funds, the return falls
year by year. This appears in fact to be the case with the sub-
stantial majority of Australian companies engaged mainly in
trading and manufacturing.
Company 4:
For new development, the return required is 20 per cent. At times
capital e)5.penditure is incurred not so much to increase profit
returns as to provide increased amenities for customers. In such
cases profitability cannot be measured in terms of percentage
return.
Company 5:
New activity after three years: 10 per cent per annum. New
equipment for greater efficiency: 10 per cent per annum. Essential
replacement: No percentage required.
Company 6:
The required percentage on assets must be adequate to pay all
interest and overhead charges plus a dividend requirement and a
surplus to be added to reserves. This percentage becomes a mini-
mum. The percentage varies from period to period, depending
upon gearing between shareholders' and borrowed funds.
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Company 7:
An ideal is possibly 18 per cent in the first full year, but it is difficult
to attain. Quite often proposals are developed on, say, a 10 per cent
return with the knowledge that growth will carry this to a much
higher level in later years.
Company 8:
For proposals with an approximate economic life of five years:
40 per cent per annum.
Cornpany 9:
Expansion proposals with some element of risk: 40 per cent.
Expansion proposals requiring small capital outlay and small
risk: 30 per cent.
Company 10:
Replacement proposals out of reserves: 17 per cent. Replacement
proposals out of new capital: 25 per cent. Expansion proposals out
of new capital: 25 per cent.
The above comments and the great variability of the reported standards generally
suggest that the approach by management is to set standards without regard to the
managerial cost of funds, but considering rather a "satisfactory earning rate with due
allowance for risk". Management of most Australian companies does not appear to
be following theory in establishing standards for capital expenditure evaluation.
(c) Performance standards under capital rationing
It has been shown that a policy of capital rationing, whether forced upon com-
panies by external factors or self-imposed because of managerial doubts concerning
plans for the future, is sufficiently widespread to warrant a particular study of the
performance standards set by management under these conditions. Part (b) of this
section examined the performance standards reported by all companies, whether
operating under conditions of capital rationing or under conditions characterized by
adequate finance. It is the aim of this section to examine the performance standards
reported by those companies reporting a policy of capital rationing, whether this
policy is a consistent policy-that is, whether the companies reported that there were
never sufficient funds available for capital investments-or whether companies
reported that occasionally capital rationing was followed as a managerial policy.
At least two questions should be answered:
1. Do the standards adopted by companies operating under conditions of
capital rationing vary significantly from those standards adopted by com-
panies not reporting capital rationing?
2. How do management establish standards of performance when conditions of
capital rationing prevail?
The answers to these two questions should throw some light on whether manage-
ment in practice recognizes that, in theory, performance standards under capital
rationing could significantly differ from performance standards adopted when no
capital rationing is applied.
To provide an answer to the first question, an analysis has been made of the
performance standards reported by those companies following a policy of capital
rationing, and the companies reporting no shortage of funds for capital investments.
The analysis, presented here in Exhibit XXIII, has been divided into three sections
to compare the performance standards reported by companies using one general
percentage standard for project acceptance, with separate analyses for situations
where varying percentages were reported for expansion proposals and replacement
proposals.
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EXHIBIT XXIII
ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS REPORTED BY AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES
20.00
12.00
12.30
5.06
41.14
14.00
10.00
9.86
3.61
36.60
16.00
12.00
12.18
3.79
31.12
All Companies
Reporting
Occasional or
Consistent
Capital
Rationing
(4)
18.00
12.00
11.09
4.47
40.31
13.00
12.00
12.00
4.07
33.92
(3)
All Companies
Reporting
Consistent
Capital
Rationing
14.00 6.00
11.00 7.00
10.28 8.00
3.70 2.34
35.99 24.25
25.00
12.00
13.14
5.20
39.57
16.00
12.00
12.23
3.69
30.17
(2)
All Companies
Reporting
Occasional
Capital
Rationing
STANDARD FOR REPLACEMENT PROPOSALS REPORTED
E STANDARD FOR EXPANSION PROPOSALS REPORTED
g
lies
No
GENERAL PERCENTAGE STANDARD REPORTED
------~-----"-------------------
All Compa!
Reporting
Capital
Rationin
(I)
(a) WHERE ONE
-"
Range 21.00
Median 10.00
Mean 12.26
Standard deviation 5.28
Coefficient of
dispersion 43.07
(b) WHERE A PERCENTAG
-----
Range 14.00
Median 12.00
Mean 12.34
Standard deviation 4.01
Coefficient of
dispersion 32.50
--------"-----
(c) WHERE A PERCENTAGE
Range 10.00
Median 6.00
Mean 7.46
Standard deviation 3.30
Coefficient of
dispersion 44.24
The analysis appearing in column (4) of Exhibit XXIII combines the results from
columns (2) and (3). Column (4) represents the analysis for companies reporting
capital rationing either occasionally or on a consistent basis, column (2) represents
the analysis of companies reporting occasional capital rationing only, and column (3)
represents the analysis of companies reporting consistent capital rationing.
There are some conflicting results presented in Exhibit XXIII. For example,
where one general percentage standard was reported, the mean for all companies
reporting no capital rationing is higher than for companies applying or reporting
capital rationing either occasionally or on a consistent basis. Admittedly the difference
between the figures is probably insignificant; however, it might be surprising that there
is any similarity between the average for figures reported under conditions where
funds are adequate and those reported when capital rationing applies. It is noticeable
that the standard deviation of the performance standards reported is significantly
higher when no capital rationing is reported than in other situations. Similarly, the
range is much higher when no capital rationing is evident, which appears to indicate
that the performance standards adopted when no capital rationing is evident are more
likely to vary to a greater degree from company to company than may be expected
when capital rationing is imposed as a managerial policy.
When specific performance standards were reported for expansion projects, it is
noticed that companies reporting occasional capital rationing indicated performance
standards with a mean significantly higher than companies reporting no capital
rationing. However, companies reporting consistent capital rationing also reported
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performance standards with a mean lower than that reported by companies with no
capital rationing. This is an apparent contradiction in results and it can possibly only
be concluded that management is influenced by other factors, such as risk or un-
certainty, in adopting such low performance standards under these conditions of
persistent capital rationing.
Where performance standards were reported for replacement proposals, the
analyzed results appear to follow theory more closely than has been seen above.
Thus the mean or average for companies reporting capital rationing, either on a
consistent basis or occasionally, is significantly higher than the average of performance
standards reported by companies with no capital rationing. Standard deviation varies
from one group to the other, but generally the coefficient of dispersion is significantly
lower for companies acting under conditions of capital rationing than for those
operating with a ready supply of funds.
As a general concl:usion from Exhibit XXIII, it is evident there is no clear pattern
of performance by management in practice in establishing standards under capital
rationing. It would appear reasonable to suggest that management does set higher
standards for replacement proposals under capital rationing than under conditions
where adequate funds are available. However, there does not appear to be any signifi-
cant difference between general performance standards and standards set for expansion
projects, either under capital rationing or under conditions of adequate funds.
In order to isolate any variations in practice between companies operating in
different industries, Exhibits XXIV and XXV analyze the performance standards
reported by companies under conditions of capital rationing and non-capital rationing,
for manufacturing companies (in Exhibit XXIV) and for non-manufacturing com-
panies (in Exhibit XXV).
Manufacturing companies reporting separate performance standards for ex-
pansion proposals and replacement proposals under conditions of capital rationing
appear to establish significantly higher standards than those established when no
capital rationing applies. Thus for expansion projects the mean of performance
EXHIBIT XXIV
ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS REPORTED BY MANUFACTURING COMPANIES
I No Capital Rationing I Occasional or Consistent
I Reported Capital Rationing Reported
----
(a) WHERE ONE GENERAL PERCENTAGE STANDARD REPORTED
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
15.50
12.00
12.25
4.52
36.90
15.00
12.00
10.80
3.38
31.30
(b) WHERE A PERCENTAGE STANDARD FOR EXPANSlON PROPOSALS REPORTED
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
7.50
12.00
11.60
2.76
23.79
24.00
12.00
12.86
5.49
42.69
(c) WHERE A PERCENTAGE STANDARD FOR REPLACEMENT PROPOSALS REPORTED
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
5.20
9.00
7.43
2.30
30.96
14.00
10.00
10.75
3.44
32.00
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standards reported under capital rationing is 12.86 per cent, while the mean for the
standards reported when no capital rationing applies is 11.60 per cent. Similarly,
where separate performance standards are reported for replacement proposals,
the mean under conditions of capital rationing is 10.75 per cent, while, when no
capital rationing applies, the mean is a relatively low 7.43 per cent. In both the above
cases the standard deviation is greater under capital rationing than under non-capital
rationing conditions, and hence the coefficient of dispersion is much greater under
rationing conditions. Where a general performance standard was reported however,
the mean of the performance standard was lower under conditions of capital rationing
than under non-rationing conditions. This, as before, appears to be an inconsistency
in managerial policy or reporting.
The analysis of performance standards reported by non-manufacturing companies
does not follow the pattern revealed in Exhibit XXIV, with the exception of those
standards reported for replacement proposals which are apparently much higher in
capital rationing situations than under non-capital rationing conditions. Where a
general performance standard is adopted by non-manufacturing companies, the mean
or average of standards reported for companies operating under capital rationing is
slightly higher than under non-capital rationing conditions, although the difference is
probably not significant. Performance standards reported for expansion proposals
are significantly lower under capital rationing conditions than under non-rationing
conditions. This would appear to be a further contradiction in the analysis, as it
would be difficult to see why performance standards under capital rationing should
be lower than when adequate funds are presumably available.
EXHIBIT XXV
ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS REPORTED DY NON-MANUFACTURING COMPANIES
I
No Capital Rationing I Occasional or Consistent
Reported Capital Rationing Reported
(a) WHERE ONE GENERAL PERCENTAGE STANDARD REPORTED
----,----------------,----~----------------
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
19.00
9.00
12.27
6.33
51.59
14.00
12.00
12.37
4.20
33.95
--------------------'-----~---------
(b) WHERE A PERCENTAGE STANDARD FOR EXPANSION PROPOSALS REPORTED
---------------.
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
-------~--
15.00
12.00
12.83
4.66
36.32
20.00
11.00
11.61
4.51
38.85
l _
(c) WHERE A PERCENTAGE STANDARD FOR REPLACEMENT PROPOSALS REPORTED
-------------,-------------,------------~
Range
Median
Mean
Standard deviation
Coefficient of dispersion
11.00
6.00
7.50
4.38
58.40
8.00
9.00
8.30
2.28
27.47
------------
In answer to the question originally asked, "Are standards adopted by companies
under capital rationing different from those adopted by companies not experiencing
capital rationing?", it can be stated that, where separate performance standards are
applied for replacement proposals, these performance standards are much higher
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under conditions of capital rationing than under non-rationing conditions. However,
the position concerning the general standard of performance or a specific standard of
performance for expansion proposals is not clear. In these two latter cases, the per-
formance standards adopted under capital rationing are generally equal to or some-
what lower than those adopted under non-capital rationing conditions. The reason
for this could only be ascertained by extensive personal interviews with the manage-
ment of the companies concerned.
In attempting to answer the question concerning the method of selecting the
adopted performance standards under conditions of capital rationing, a comparison
has been made between the reported standards by companies operating under these
conditions and four percentage figures calculated from financial data for individual
companies concerned. These percentage figures are:
1. The weighted average cost of capital
2. A net earning rate based on total funds employed
3. A cash earning rate based on total funds employed
4. The ratio between after-tax net profit and paid-up capital.
The weighted average cost of capital used is equivalent to a borrowing rate based
on dividends paid and interest rates paid on the nominal value of the funds employed.
An illustration of this average cost of capital for one of the companies included is
presented in Exhibit XXVI. As the performance standards were converted to an after-
taxation standard percentage, the average cost of capital has been adjusted to reflect
an after-taxation percentage calculation.
EXHIBIT XXVI
CALCULATION OF AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL
-
APITAL FUNDS AMOUNT PERCENTAGE COST AFTER-TAX EFFECTIVE
£ MILLION OF TOTAL (40 PER CENT) COST COST
Percentage Percentage Percentage
.d-up capital 5.206 80.65 7.00 7.00 5.64
secured notes 0400 6.19 6.75 4.05 .25
erdraft .850 13.16 7.50 4.50 .59
6048
C
Pat
Un
Ov
The net earning rate on total funds employed is represented by the calculation:
Net profit after tax + interest paid on long term debt
Shareholders' funds + total long term debt
In using this calculation, it was assumed that interest on long term debt was by nature
a return on debt funds employed within the business. Thus the aim of this calculation
was to arrive at the total earning percentage for funds that could be readily identified
as being long term funds in a particular business. It would not be expected that any
great correlation between the cost of capital and this earning rate would exist.
The net cash earning rate is an extension of the above earning rate, and is equal
to:
Net profit after tax + interest on long term debt + annual depreciation 100
.---..------.- . X -
Total shareholders' funds employed + total long term debt 1
This percentage represents the relationship between annual cash return and total
long term funds employed.
Each of the four percentage calculations has been compared with performance
standards reported by companies. For each company, the reported standard selected
for the comparisons was either a general standard or a specific standard for expansion
proposals. Comparisons are in terms of mean and standard deviation for each group,
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and the coefficient of correlation between the reported standards and each of the four
calculations.
EXHIBIT XXVII
ash Net Profi t/
ning Paid-Up Capital
2.00 8.64
4.28 4.80
287 +.207
Reported Average Cost Net I C
of Capital Earning Ear
Mean 11.97 8.43 8.51 1
Standard deviation 4.77 4.14 3.28
Coefficient of
correlation - +.068 +.0185 +.
According to the analysis in Exhibit XXVII, it is not possible to conclude that
management adopts any ofthe four calculations in determining performance standards.
There is no direct relationship between reported cut-off points and the average cost of
capital, net earning rate, or the ratio of net profit to paid-up capital. While there is
some direct correlation between reported cut-off points and cash earning rate, it is
not sufficiently significant to allow the latter to be used as a guide for managerial
decision-making. It could be assumed that management would adopt some concept of
an earning rate as a cut-off standard, based on a required return on capital employed
and adjusted for future risks and expectations. If this assumption is correct, it may be
impossible to arrive at any financial ratio from reported data which would reflect
exactly the cut-off standards adopted by management. Statistical ratios may serve as a
guide to management actions, but the final standards accepted may vary from these
ratios as the result of managerial subjective judgment.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This research has investigated performance standards adopted by Australian
companies making use of rate of return analyses in their capital budgeting procedures.
The purpose of this study has been to determine
(1) to what extent cut-off standards have been accepted as normal practice,
(2) the actual cut-off standards set by companies in various industries,
(3) the importance of capital rationing for these companies, and
(4) the influence of capital rationing on the cut-off standards established.
Some 63.3 per cent of the companies have adopted the practice of establishing
predetermined minimum cut-off rates. However, from the many additional comments
that accompanied the completed questionnaire sheets, it is obvious that considerable
emphasis is placed on "non-financial" factors such as quality improvement, market
share, prestige, etc., and managerial judgment in varying the cut-off rates to allow for
future expectations. The impression is often given that profitability calculations are
used only as supplementary support for decisions already made by management,
rather than to select proposals that should be included in the budget. Retail trading
and wholesale/distribution companies were shown to be less inclined to adopt pre-
determined standards than manufacturing companies. Similarly, medium-sized
companies appear to be somewhat more reluctant to use the standards in capital
investment analysis than large or small companies.
Actual cut-off standards reported varied from 3 per cent to 30 per cent (on an
after-taxation basis), and the majority of the replies were bunched around 9 per cent-
10 per cent, 12 per cent, 15 per cent and 20 per cent. Where companies establish
differing standards for expansion projects and replacement projects, the latter are
significantly lower than the former (mean for expansion standards: 13.5 per cent;
mean for replacement standards: 9.1 per cent), and, where general standards have
been adopted, these could be expected to fall between the two extremes (mean for
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general standards: 12.0 per cent). Manufacturing companies adopt standards signifi-
cantly higher than the average for all companies; retail companies adopt standards
significantly lower than the average.
Capital rationing affects to some extent the budgeting policies of 61.2 per cent
of Australian companies. Retail trading and finance companies are affected less, and
rationing is most significant for wholesale/distribution companies. The largest and
smallest companies are less concerned with capital rationing than medium-sized
companies.
Capital rationing appears to have little effect on setting cut-off rates, except
where separate standard rates are established for replacement proposals. Under
capital rationing, these replacement standards are significantly higher than similar
standards set by companies not operating under rationing conditions. While it was to
be expected that all cut-off rates under capital rationing would be significantly higher
than corresponding standards set under non-rationing conditions, there was found to
be little difference in standards in these two situations for expansion proposals or for
any general cut-ofr rates used.
In establishing cut-off rates under conditions of capital rationing, it is probable
that management uses as a basis some cash earning rate on funds employed, adjusted
for future expectations of risk, uncertainty, competition, etc. The average cost of
capital percentage appears to have little or no relation to the standards adopted, and
it is unlikely that the marginal cost of capital is considered by management as a
suitable standard. In the majority of cases the predetermined cut-off rates are probably
not used to isolate acceptable proposals (as in theory), but rather serve as an additional
justification for proposals already accepted by management, or as an indication that
"non-financial" factors are often necessary to support the acceptance of proposals
that cannot be justified by profitability analysis.
A SELECTION OF
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND PAPERS
Available from the University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia
Variations in the Occupational Structure of Central Places of the Darling 4/--
Downs, Q., by R. S. Dick, Department of Geography, vol. I, no. 2 .. 40c
The Vocational Contributions of Women Graduates of the University of 2/-
Queensland, by M. W. Rorke, Department of Education, vol. 1, no. 1 .. 20c
First and Second Surveys of the l!-.1lects of a Subnormal Child on the
Family Unit, by F. J. Schonell, 1. G. Meddleton, B. H. Watts, and M. W. 3/-
Rorke, Department of Education, vol. I, no. 2 30c
School Attainments and Home Background of Aboriginal Children, by
F. J. Schonell, I. G. Meddleton, and B. H. Watts, Department of 5/6
Education, vol. I, no. 3 SSe
The Reading Attainments ofPrimary School Children in Three Queensland 3/-
Schools, by R. J. Andrews, Department of Education, vol. I, no. 4 30c
Top Public Servants in Two States, by B. B. Schaffer and K. W. Knight, 5/-
Department of History and Political Science, vol. T, no. 1 SOc
The Maritime Boundaries of Queensland and New South Wales, by R. D. 2/..·
Lumb, Faculty of Law. vol. I, no. 4 20c
Pasture Investigations in the Yalleroi District of Central Queensland, by
L. A. Edye, L. R. Humphreys, E. F. Henzell, and L. J. H. Teakle, 3/-
Department of Agriculture, vol. I, no. 4 .. 30c
A General Theory of Social Organization and Behaviour, by G. McBride, 5/-
Faculty of Veterinary Science, vol. I, no. 2 SOc
A Study of Some Accounting Problems in the Oil Industry, by F. K. 4/-
Alfredson, Department of Accountancy, vol. J, no. 1 40c
Administrative Control of Capital Expenditure:. A Survey of Australian
Public Companies, by G. G. Meredith, Department of Accountancy, vol. 3/-
I, no. 2 30c
The Theory of Profit Determination on Long Term Contracts and an
Appraisal of Australian Practice, by G. W. Beck, Department of 4/-
Accountancy, vol. I, no. 3 40c
